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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
During its second regular session, the Eighty-Fourth General Assembly
enacted substantial revisions to the Missouri Employment Security Law.' One
of the newly enacted sections prohibits the estoppel of a party in a proceeding
with "[a]ny finding of fact, conclusion of law, judgment or order made" under
the Employment Security Law, regardless of the nature of the forum in which
the subsequent proceeding arises.2 This section was added in response to the
recent Missouri Supreme Court decision in Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores
Co. 3 which held that if the requirements of Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co. of
America' were satisfied, the findings of an administrative tribunal could be
used to collaterally estop parties to subsequent judicial proceedings." The
1. H.B. 1485, 84th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., 1988 Mo. Legis. Serv. 2 (to be
codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 288.030-.381) (Supp. 1988).
2. The statute provides:
1. Any finding of fact, conclusion of law, judgment or order made by an
appeals tribunal, the labor and industrial relations commission or any person
with the authority to make findings of fact or law in any proceeding under
this chapter shall not be conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent
action not brought under this chapter, and shall not be used as evidence in
any subsequent or separate action not brought under this chapter, before an
arbitrator, commissioner, commission, administrative law judge, judge or
court of this state or of the United States, regardless of whether the prior
action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.
2. Any finding of fact, conclusion of law, judgment or order made by an
arbitrator, commissioner, commission, administrative law judge, judge or any
other person or body with authority to make findings of fact or law in any
proceeding not brought under this chapter shall not be binding or conclusive
on an appeals tribunal or the labor and industrial relations commission in any
subsequent or separate proceeding brought under this chapter, regardless of
whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved
the same facts.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.215 (Supp. 1988).
3. 726 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
4. 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979) (en bane); see infra note 21 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
In Bresnahan, the plaintiff was discharged from her job at a department store on the
ground that she stole from her employer. She applied for unemployment compensation
benefits, but her application was denied because the deputy found that she had stolen
from her employer and had therefore engaged in aggravated misconduct connected
with her work. Id. at 327-28. The plaintiff appealed the decision of the deputy and was
given a hearing before the Appeals Tribunal of the Division of Employment Security.
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legislature apparently believed that the possibility of being collaterally es-
topped had caused parties to unemployment compensation hearings to turn the
hearings into full-blown adversary proceedings, and thus to subvert the goal of
expediting decisions in such cases.'
Bresnahan was decided in the context of an unemployment compensation
proceeding, and the legislature chose to overrule its holding in the narrow con-
text of the Employment Security Law. The Bresnahan opinion indicates, how-
ever, that the supreme court's intent was to extend the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to all administrative adjudications which satisfy the Oates test.7 Un-
less the Missouri General Assembly or the Missouri Supreme Court indicates
to the contrary, parties to administrative adjudications that do not arise under
the state's Employment Security Law should assume that they later may be
estopped on issues that were decided in the administrative hearing.
Application of collateral estoppel in this context is not without precedent.8
It is not, however, universally accepted and its adoption can generate
Evidence, including live testimony, was presented by both parties at the hearing. The
appeals referee affirmed the determination of the deputy, and the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission later affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal. Id. at 328-
29. Ms. Bresnahan did not seek judicial review of the final decision of the Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission and instead filed suit for wrongful discharge against
her former employer. She received a jury verdict in her favor on a count of breach of
implied contract of employment and was assessed actual damages of $116,000.00 and
punitive damages of $10,000.00. Id. at 329. On appeal, the supreme court held that the
trial court should have ruled in favor of the defendant on the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel and that the plaintiff could not relitigate the issue of whether she
had been discharged for good cause, i.e., whether she had stolen from her employer. Id.
Cf. King v. City of Pagedale, 573 F. Supp. 309, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1983) ("A state admin-
istrative proceeding is not sufficient to support preclusion standing alone, but preclusion
does arise if the administrative decision is affirmed on judicial review.").
Bresnahan may have been foreshadowed by Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. Direc-
tor of Revenue, 687 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The court in this case refused
to give preclusive effect to a decision made by the State Tax Commission, but it did not
foreclose the possibility of ever giving collateral estoppel effect to an administrative
agency decision:
The Tax Commission plays an important part in the revenue system of
the state, but its members are not required to be legally trained. Its review
function over deficiencies has now been assigned to the Administrative Hear-
ing Commission, which provides a hearing before a commissioner who must
be a member of the bar. It is appropriate to consider the nature of a tribunal
in determining the estoppel effect of its rulings.
Id. at 170-71 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment b (1982)).
6. Bresnahan, 726 S.W.2d at 332 (Blackmar, J., dissenting); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comment d (1982); id. § 83 comment h, illustra-
tion 13.
7. 726 S.W.2d at 329-30.
8. E.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966);
Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1984); Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598
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controversy. This controversy stems from the perceived effects of the extension
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, effects upon the rights of individual liti-
gants and upon the administrative process itself.9 This Comment will discuss
the countervailing policies that are at the heart of the controversy and formu-
late an understanding of when it is appropriate to collaterally estop a litigant
on issues that have previously been decided in an administrative adjudication.
A. Collateral Estoppel in General
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments' 0 states the general rule of col-
lateral estoppel in the following manner: "When an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the deter-
mination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a sub-
sequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim."" Application of this principle serves the basic policy goals of fairness,
finality, judicial economy and efficiency, and consistency in adjudicatory deci-
sion-making.12
But the general rule is subject to certain exceptions. Two are of particular
interest in analyzing the arguments for and against administrative collateral
estoppel:
A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality of
9. E.g., Bresnahan, 726 S.W.2d at 331-35 (Blackmar, J., dissenting); see also
Agatstein, The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Should Not Apply to Administrative
Hearings, 7 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDGES 26, 28-37 (Spring 1987) (estoppel inappropri-
ate because of differences in nature and purpose of administrative adjudications as
compared to judicial proceedings); Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel:
Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceed-
ings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 445-46 (1983) ("many courts have lost sight of the
foundational elements of collateral estoppel .... [and] in novel situations combine[]
mechanistic reasoning ... with the extreme flexibility of certain standards" and thus
achieve unfair results).
10. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Restatement.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The Restatement
speaks in terms of a rule of res judicata, and divides it into the categories of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion:
The rule of claim preclusion ... is that a party ordinarily may not assert a
civil claim arising from a transaction with respect to which he has already
prosecuted such a claim, whether or not the two claims wholly correspond to
each other. The rule of issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as collateral
estoppel ... is that a party ordinarily may not relitigate an issue that he fully
and fairly litigated on a previous occasion.
Id. ch. 1. Since the Missouri judiciary had not fully abandoned the traditional termi-
nology of res judicata and collateral estoppel, this Comment will refer to issue preclu-
sion as collateral estoppel.
12. E.g., Shaffer v. Terrydale Management Corp., 648 S.W.2d 595, 608 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine
of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a
Court of Law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 84 (1986).
19881
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extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts . . .; or .... There
is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue . . . be-
cause the party sought to be precluded, as a result of . . .special circum-
stances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and
fair adjudication in the initial action.1 '
B. Administrative Collateral Estoppel
In addition to the sections on collateral estoppel in general, a new section
of the Restatement specifically deals with the problem of when it is appropri-
ate for a second tribunal to give preclusive effect to an issue first decided in an
administrative adjudication. The general rule of the section is that "a valid
and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the
same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and
qualifications, as a judgment of a court."" The language which follows this
statement of the rule limits its application to administrative proceedings that
are conducted in accord with the "essential elements of adjudication." These
elements are notice to parties to be bound; the right to present and rebut evi-
dence and argument; "formulation of issues of law and fact;" finality; and any
"other procedural elements as may be necessary," taking into account the na-
ture of the matter to be decided. 5
Besides making an exception for administrative determinations which
were not the product of proceedings which "entailed the essential elements of
adjudication,"' 0 the Restatement specifically excludes determinations where
"the scheme of remedies permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding
the adjudication of the first claim,"' " or where to give preclusive effect to the
administrative determination would be "incompatible with a legislative pol-
icy." 18 The Restatement's introductory note and comments make clear that in
this exception, the drafters were concerned that the second tribunal be sensi-
tive to policy considerations which weigh against the application of adminis-
trative collateral estoppel in a particular case.19 A mechanistic application of a
test for collateral estoppel can lead to inappropriate results in cases arising
solely within the judicial system.20 When the question of collateral estoppel
arises in a multi-forum context, there is even greater need for a refined analy-
sis. Such a context gives rise to added considerations involved in analyzing the
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3), (5) (1982).
14. Id. § 83(1).
15. Id. § 83(2).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 83(3) comment h, illustration 14. The enactment of Mo. REV. STAT,
§ 288.215 (Supp. 1988) has the effect of bringing administrative adjudications by the
Division of Employment Security and Labor and Industrial Relations Commission
within this exception.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (1982).
19. Id. ch. 6, at 265; see also § 83 comment h.
20. See e.g., Perschbacher, supra note 9, at 445.
[Vol. 53
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possible effects of administrative collateral estoppel, not only upon the judicial
system and the individual litigants, but also upon the interests of the adminis-
trative agency and its ability to serve effectively the public interest in carrying
out its legislative mandate.
C. The Missouri Approach
In Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co."' the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a four-
part test for Missouri courts to determine whether application of collateral
estoppel is appropriate in a given case:
The court in reviewing whether the application of collateral estoppel is
appropriate should consider: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudi-
cation was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2)
whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; and (3)
whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Most courts have added a
fourth factor to the three enunciated . . . whether the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the prior suit.22
When Bresnahan was decided, the court based its holding upon an appli-
cation of this Oates test without reference to the policy considerations unique
to the situation. In other words, the court did not appear to recognize the
implications of its holding upon the ability of the Division of Employment Se-
curity to effectively process claims for unemployment compensation benefits.
The dissenting opinion in Bresnahan accuses the majority of applying the
Oates test "mechanically and uncritically." 23 It further contends that the court
erred in failing "to consider the purpose of the administrative proceedings and
the nature of the hearing before the appeals tribunal."'2 4 Although this lan-
guage appears to indicate the dissenting judges' concern about the possible
adverse effects upon the ability of the Division of Employment Security to
perform its functions, the dissent never addressed that issue. Instead, the
thrust of the dissent's argument is aimed entirely at perceived procedural inad-
equacies in administrative adjudications and concludes that the plaintiff in
Bresnahan was unfairly deprived of a jury trial.25
Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent addressed what was a, perhaps
21. 583 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
22. Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); see
also Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("It is at least arguable
that the fourth factor of full and fair opportunity to litigate ... is applicable only
where there is absence of mutuality."). But see Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
726 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Mo. 1987) (en bane) (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (there is "no
doubt that this fourth factor is part of law in Missouri").
23. 726 S.W.2d at 331 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 331-35.
1988]
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the, crucial issue in the case: how would the application of administrative col-
lateral estoppel affect the ability of the Division of Employment Security to
carry out its legislative mandate? Although the question is moot in light of the
General Assembly's action to overrule Bresnahan in the Employment Security
Law context, 6 the same issue will have to be addressed when determinations
of other administrative agencies are considered for possible preclusive effects
in subsequent lawsuits.
1. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
The analysis of the first three prongs of the Oates test would be the same
whether or not the question of collateral estoppel arises in a multi-forum con-
text. It need not be repeated here. The fourth prong, full and fair opportunity
to litigate in the prior suit, incorporates the Restatement exceptions for differ-
ences in quality or extensiveness of procedures and inadequacies of opportu-
nity or incentive to fully litigate the issue in the prior suit.27 The drafters of
the Restatement refer to these two factors as the "essential" procedural issues:
If the prior opportunity and incentive to litigate the claim or issue in question
were substantially the same as would have existed had the matter been adju-
dicated in the second forum, the procedural prerequisites exist for normal ap-
plication of the rules of res judicata. The comparison of procedures should
focus on the practical aspects of the procedures involved and not simply on
matters of form. For example, proof-taking in an administrative ... tribunal
may be relatively informal but may nevertheless permit the parties to present
substantially the same evidence that might be adduced through the more for-
mal procedures characteristic of courts. 28
The supposed lack of adequate procedural protection was the subject of
much of the Bresnahan dissent and is commonly advanced to support argu-
ments by opponents of administrative collateral estoppel.29 This factor will be
discussed in conjunction with the Restatement requirement that administrative
collateral estoppel only be applied where the administrative proceeding "en-
tailed the essential elements of adjudication."2 0 In addition, policy considera-
tions unique to administrative collateral estoppel will be discussed as to when
and to what extent might an administrative agency be affected adversely in
carrying out its legislative mandate if its adjudicative determinations are given
preclusive effect in a court of law.
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.215 (Supp. 1988).
27. See supra text accompanying note 13.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 6 introductory note, at 265
(1982).
29. E.g., Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 331-34 (Mo.
1987) (en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting); see also Carlisle, supra note 12, at 80-94;
see generally Agatstein, supra note 8.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982).
[Vol. 53
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a. The Essential Elements of Adjudication
Perhaps the most common objection raised to administrative collateral es-
toppel is that, because administrative procedures do not fully conform to the
judicial model, they are inadequate to protect the rights of the parties to be
estopped. Since the party to be estopped has not had an opportunity to fully
develop the issues, it would not be fair to preclude him or her from doing so in
the subsequent proceeding.31 Proponents of this view find support for it not
only in the differences in procedures between the two forums, but also in the
combination of functions commonly found in administrative agencies. This
combination carries the potential for biased decision-making. 2
The extent and adequacy of procedural safeguards are defined in the Mis-
souri Administrative Procedure and Review Act." The Act is based upon the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act .3 It mandates that minimum pro-
cedural safeguards to be followed when an agency adjudication is a contested
case.
A contested case within the meaning of the Act is "a proceeding before
an agency in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law to be determined after hearing." 35 The definition is specific.
There must be a statute, municipal charter, ordinance, or constitutional provi-
sion that requires a hearing before legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are determined.36 If there is no such requirement of a prior hearing, an
agency decision affecting the private rights of a specific party must be tested
against the Due Process Clause of the Constitution37 and not against the pro-
cedures set forth in the Act.
A contested case is commenced by the filing of a writing, analogous to a
civil pleading.38 The Act provides for "[a]nswering, intervening, and amenda-
tory writings" as well as motions.39 If a writing asks for affirmative relief, it
must "state what relief is sought or proposed and the reason for granting it"
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Carlisle, supra note 12, at 87-88.
33. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010-.215 (1986) [hereinafter the Act].
34. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROc. AcT, 14 U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 1988). Missouri
adopted the original Model Act of 1944 and still retains in substance this version of the
Act. 14 U.L.A. 363 (1980).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(2) (1986).
36. E.g., State ex rel Leggett v. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Mo. 1958) (en
banc); Walker v. Personnel Advisory Bd., 670 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Kopper
Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(discussion of the due process limitations placed upon informal administrative adjudi-
cation); see also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, chs. 12-13 (2d ed. 1979)
(when due process requires trial-type hearing and discussion of fair informal
procedures).
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without simply being "phrased in the language of a statute or a rule."' 0 The
agency must "promptly mail a notice of institution of the case to all necessary
parties."4 Notice shall also be mailed "to all persons designated by the mov-
ing party and to any other persons to whom the agency may determine that
notice should be given." '42 The notice must include "[a] brief statement of the
matter involved in the case unless a copy of the writing accompanies [the]
notice."4 3 The Act also provides that a notice of hearing must be mailed to the
moving party, to all other parties to the proceeding, and to all persons to
whom notice of institution of the case was mailed.44
Discovery in contested cases is limited to depositions and subpoenas duces
tecum unless the hearing is before the Administrative Hearing Commission
(AHC). If the case is before the AHC, the parties have available to them all
the discovery devices which would be available to them in a case tried in cir-
cuit court.4 6 The Act directs the agency to issue subpoenas "upon request of
any party," but issuance of subpoenas duces tecum is within the Agency's dis-
cretion.46 Administrative agencies do not possess enforcement powers, how-
ever, and must request subpoena enforcement from the circuit court of the
county where the hearing is located or where the witness resides or can be
located.47 The same is true when an agency seeks to punish a party for
contempt.48
The Act states that "[r]easonable opportunity shall be given for the prep-
aration and presentation of evidence bearing on any issue raised or decided or
relief sought or granted. 14 A party may present evidence by oral testimony
under oath or through introduction of exhibits. 50 The Act also provides for the
introduction of business records, statistical studies and reports, and affidavits.51
40. Id. § 536.063(2).
41. Id. § 536.067(1).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 536.067(2)(c).
44. Id. § 536.067(3).
45. Id. § 536.073. The Administrative Hearing Commission (authorized by Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 621.015-.205 (1986)) is an adjudicative tribunal within the Office of
Administration. Its function is to conduct hearings in licensing cases involving certain
state agencies, primarily those involved in licensing professionals. The Commission also
hears appeals from decisions made by the Director of Revenue. Adjudications by the
Commission appear more "judicial" than do other agency adjudications in that the
procedures followed are more formal. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 20-2 (1980). Commis-
sioners are required to be attorneys admitted to practice in Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 621.015 (1986). See generally Special Project, Fair Treatment for the Licensed Pro-
fessional: The Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. REV. 410
(1972).
46. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.077 (1986).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 536.095.
49. Id. § 536.063.3.
50. Id. § 536.070.1-.070.2.
51. Id. § 536.070.10-.070.12.
[Vol. 53
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As to receipt of evidence, it states that:
Each party shall have the right to call and examine witnesses, to intro-
duce exhibits, to cross-examine opposing witnesses on any matter relevant to
the issues even though that matter was not the subject of the direct examina-
tion, to impeach any witness regardless of which party first called him to tes-
tify, and to rebut the evidence against him.52
In addition, each party to a contested case is "entitled to present oral argu-
ment or written briefs [analogous to proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law] at or after the hearing which shall be heard or read by each official of
the agency" who participates in the final decision. 3 The Act as well provides
for a point in the process where the decision of the agency becomes final."
Although the Act affords procedural protections to parties to administra-
tive adjudications,55 including the rights of notice, limited discovery, oral and
written argument, compulsory process, presentation of evidence, and the op-
portunity to cross-examine witnesses and rebut evidence; these procedures are
not identical to those available in a judicial hearing. For example, the civil
rules of evidence do not apply to administrative adjudications. 6 Proceedings
are usually conducted in a less formal manner than those conducted in a
court,57 parties are generally limited in their use of pre-hearing discovery, 8
52. Id. § 536.070.2.
53. Id. § 536.080.1.
54. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.200.2 (Supp. 1988) (decision of agency becomes
final ten days after parties notified or notice is mailed).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52.
56. The general rule in Missouri is that while the "technical rules of evidence are
not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence apply." Mis-
souri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo. 1977),
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978). Thus, while admission of hearsay evidence
does not in and of itself deprive a party of a fair hearing, Conners v. Missouri Div. of
Family Servs., 576 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), the hearing officer must exclude
irrelevant evidence. Eastern Star Missionary Baptist Church v. Missouri State Div. of
Family Servs., 632 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Professor Davis notes that the common law rules of evidence were meant for use in
jury trials. DAvis, supra note 36, § 16:4, at 234. He suggests that, in the federal sys-
tem, the Federal Rules of Evidence should only apply to jury trials and that non-jury
trials should be tried on "any relevant evidence" as is the case with agency adjudica-
tion: "If the purpose of any trial, whether in a court or in an agency, is to find facts
accurately and efficiently, then having two systems of evidence, one of which excludes
particular evidence that the other admits, is irrational, unless some reason justifies the
system." Id. § 14:1, at 3. Davis also points out that:
Although administrative agencies may be freed from observance of strict
common-law rules of evidence for jury trials, it is erroneous to suppose that
agencies do not, as a result, observe some rules of evidence. . . . That strict
adherence to standards of relevance and probative value should be observed
needs no underscoring.
Id. § 16:4 (quoting Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, at 70-
71 (1941 Report)).
57. Boyd v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 657 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also
DAvis, supra note 36, § 14:1, at 3:
19881
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and the administrative hearing officer is not required to be an attorney. 9 But
these differences in procedure do not render hearings conducted in accordance
with the Act defective under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.6 '
Parties are protected from unlawful administrative decisions by provisions for
judicial review in the state constitution6" and implemented either by the Act 2
or by agency organic acts.63
The "essential elements of adjudication" 64 presuppose an unbiased and
competent decision-maker regardless of the forum in which the adjudication
takes place. Although the Act presumes that "unbiased and competent" does
not of necessity mean that the decision-maker must be an attorney, some ar-
gue that to fulfill these qualities he or she must be. 66
"Unbiased" simply means that the decision-maker has not prejudged the
contested issues in a case. Impartiality is required in administrative adjudica-
tions as a matter of due process.66 Although biased decision-making is always
a legitimate concern when the "legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific
parties are [to be] determined,' 67 it is erroneous to assume that administrative
[A] cluster of largely false assumptions ... [has] been widely accepted
by judges, administrators, and practitioners and ... [is] in the nature of a
basic philosophy. Some samples of the largely false assumptions that in com-
bination have been especially harmful are (1) that the best way to untangle a
jumble of disputed facts, confused law, and undetermined policy is to conduct
a huge trial, allowing witnesses to argue about policy, permitting anyone to
cross -examine any witnesses, and then purporting to decide what to do on the
basis of a record of thousands or tens of thousands of pages, [and] (2) that in
any "adjudication" a trial-type hearing is necessarily appropriate ....
Id.
58. E.g., National Advertising Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 549 S.W.2d 536
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (methods of discovery listed in statute are exclusive methods
available to parties); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.073.1 (1986). But see Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 536.073.2 (1986) and supra note 44 and accompanying text.
59. But see supra note 44.
60. King v. City of Pagedale, 573 F. Supp. 309, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1983) ("[c]ourt
has no hesitation in concluding [that Missouri's administrative procedure is] sufficient
under the Due Process clause").
61. Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 18.
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100 (1986).
63. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.210 (Supp. 1988) (party may seek judicial re-
view "within ten days after a decision of the [industrial] commission becomes final");
Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.200.2 (Supp. 1988) ("decision of the [industrial] commission
shall become final ten days after the date of notification or mailing thereof to par-
ties."); see also Greater Kansas City Baptist & Community Hosp. Ass'n v. Division of
Employment Sec., 583 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("Administrative Procedure
and Review Act . . . does not apply to agencies . . . which [have] . . . own review
procedure").
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982).
65. See Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 333 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
66. E.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010.2 (1986).
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adjudication as a whole is tainted by a lack of impartiality. While the combi-
nation of functions which characterizes administrative agencies makes biased
decision-making more than just a theoretical possibility, 8 this possibility can
be guarded against and an administrative proceedings' validity can be chal-
lenged on the ground of bias.69
The Bresnahan dissent reasoned that the lack of a requirement that ad-
ministrative hearing officers be attorneys is why administrative collateral es-
toppel was inappropriately applied.70 But it did not explain its basis for con-
cern, and left to speculation why the possession of a law degree is a necessary
prerequisite to allowing an administrative determination preclusive effect. Two
reasons are possible. Both lead to the conclusion that, unless the hearing of-
ficer is an attorney, an administrative adjudication is procedurally invalid and
should not produce results to be given any effect, much less a preclusive one.7
One unstated reason may be that only attorneys are competent to conduct
fair hearings in accordance with rules of procedure and evidence. But adminis-
trative hearing officers are not constrained by such rules to the same degree as
are judges. This lack of constraint undermines the weight of the argument,72
and without such constraint to give it credence, the argument is unpersuasive.
The procedures required in administrative adjudications are not complex.
Yet if they are followed, they result in fairness to the parties. If parties are not
treated fairly because the hearing officers are incapable of following these pro-
cedures, the problem is not whether administrative collateral estoppel is appro-
priate but whether administrative adjudications validly can bind the parties at
all. 3
A second possible reason why the dissent believes that administrative
hearing officers should be attorneys before administrative determinations are
given preclusive effect may be that only attorneys are competent fact-finders.
But the place of juries as factfinders in legal actions demonstrates the weak-
ness of the argument. Lay jury members make findings on factual issues, and
such findings often are given preclusive effect. If hearing officers are incompe-
tent fact-finders, then once again the validity of administrative adjudications is
questionable. The problem becomes whether the parties should be bound at
all. The collateral estoppel issue need not even be reached."4
The concern about non-attorney hearing officers may simply be
68. Perschbacher, supra note 9, at 455.
69. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 ("[B]iased decision maker constitutionally un-
acceptable, [but] contention that . . . combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudica-
tion . . . must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators . . .")
70. Bresnahan, 726 S.W.2d at 333 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment b (1982).
72. See supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
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make-weight argument to bolster the criticism that administrative procedures
are inadequate in providing the parties an opportunity to fully and fairly liti-
gate the issues.7 5 But implicit in this concern over lack of legal credentials
may be judicial hostility toward administrative law in general. The develop-
ment in the United States of the field of administrative law includes attempts
by the legal community to limit the powers of administrative agencies.7 6 Ves-
tiges of this suspicious attitude may remain and may have surfaced in the
Bresnahan dissent in the form of strong implications that the judicial province
has been invaded. Whether or not this is true, there is no persuasive reason
why an administrative hearing officer must be an attorney before his or her
determinations should be given preclusive effect. The procedural rules followed
in an administrative adjudication do not require an attorney's expertise. Attor-
neys do not have any special competence as fact-finders which lay persons do
not also possess.
7 7
Before preclusive effect is given to a decision in an administrative hearing
the case should be separately analyzed to determine whether a "trial-type
hearing" was conducted.7 8 The Act provides for the "essential elements of
75. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
76. DAvis, supra note 36, § 1:7, at 22-23. In 1936, Justice Stone stated:
Perhaps the most striking change in the common law of this country,
certainly in recent times, has been the rise of a system of administrative law.
... Addresses before bar associations twenty years ago, discussing the rise of
new administrative agencies, are reminiscent of the distrust of equity dis-
played by the common law judges .... So far as the nostalgic yearnings for
an era that has passed would encourage us to stay the tide of a needed re-
form, they are destined to share the fate of the obstacles which Coke and his
colleagues sought to place in the way of the extension of the beneficent sway
of equity . . . . The time has come for a more ready recognition that the
procedures worked out by administrative bodies have realized this ideal [the
common law ideal of protecting individual right and justice] largely without
the coercive intervention of the courts, and that they have set up standards for
the appraisal of the specialized experience with which they are concerned
which courts could have formulated, if at all, only more tardily and with
greater difficulty.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-18 (1936).
77. See Prokopf v. Whaley, 592 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) ("deter-
mination of the credibility of witnesses is the function of the administrative tribunal");
Ceramo Co. v. Goldberg, 650 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency and must defer to the
agency's findings of fact).
78. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Manser
v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 267 (W.D. Mo. 1986); see also State v. Pur-
vis, 739 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("A judgment on the merits for pur-
poses of determining applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is one rendered
after argument and investigation, when it is determined which party is in the right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or merely technical
point .... ."); State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Emde, 706 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) ("the informal and summary nature [of small claims court] procedures does not
ensure the opportunity to fully litigate issues that is a prerequisite to the application of
[Vol. 53
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss4/10
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
adjudication" in "contested case" administrative hearings. 9 Additional proce-
dural safeguards come into play when a case comes within the jurisdiction of
the Administrative Hearing Commission.80 Although procedures for informal
adjudication are not mandated by statute' case-by-case analysis could apply
when considering whether determinations made in such adjudications should
be given preclusive effect.
b. Incentive and Opportunity to Litigate
If the interests at stake in an administrative hearing are relatively minor
compared to those at stake in a subsequent legal proceeding, it may be unfair
to afford the administrative proceeding a preclusive effect. The party involved
in the first proceeding may not have contested the issue as vigorously as she
would have had she known the important interest was at risk.,' Closely related
to the lack of vigor is the fact that parties to administrative adjudications are
often not represented by attorneys.82 Lay persons cannot ordinarily be ex-
pected to have an attorney's awareness of the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
and hence the lay or unrepresented party may be unfairly disadvantaged by a
failure to understand the implications of participating in the first
adjudication. 3
This problem is most likely to arise where the administrative hearing's
purpose is to determine eligibility for subsistence benefits. Such hearings are
designed to be conducted expeditiously and are confined to the very narrow
issue of benefit eligibility.8 4 Hearings to determine the rights of parties in
other contexts, such as professional licensing, are much more likely to be vig-
orously contested.85
collateral estoppel"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982); cf. LaRose
v. Casey, 570 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (conviction of ordinance violation
could serve as basis of collateral estoppel when party litigated conviction up through
judicial system). But cf. DAVIS, supra note 36, § 21:3, at 55 (Restatement position that
an administrative adjudication is not "conclusive under the rules of res judicata" if
procedure used does not "resemble court procedure" is "contrary to a good deal of
law").
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52.
80. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. E.g., State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Emde, 706 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4)(b) comment d (1982); id. § 83
comment h, illustration 13.
82. E.g., DAVIS, supra note 36, § 21:2, at 49-50; Agatstein, supra note 9, at 29;
Carlisle, supra note 12, at 91.
83. E.g., Agatstein, supra note 9, at 33; Carlisle, supra note 12, at 91.
84. Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 com-
ment h, illustration 13 (1982).
85. See supra note 44. Since a party to a professional licensing hearing presuma-
bly has his or her livelihood at stake, the party is likely to be prepared to fully contest
whatever issues are necessary to the decision.
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But the problems surrounding administrative hearing preclusion are not
solely focused upon the element of surprise, even though most precluded par-
ties claim that they were unfairly surprised at the preclusion. The real issue is
whether the "the amount in controversy in the first action [was] so small in
relation to the amount in controversy in the second action that preclusion
would be plainly unfair.""6
2. Effects Upon the Administrative Process
Aside from the unfairness which may result from preclusion in circum-
stances where the amount in controversy differs substantially between the two
forums, there is a very real possibility of adverse effects upon the administra-
tive agency involved. Two adverse effects are possible when parties are pre-
cluded from relitigating issues which were decided in a prior administrative
proceeding. Both of them are likely to occur when the amount at stake in the
administrative proceeding is relatively small in comparison to the amount at
stake in the subsequent litigation.
First, one who is aware of the potential for preclusion may avoid adminis-
trative adjudication altogether. A potential plaintiff with a colorable tort claim
arising out of the same facts and circumstances which gave rise to a claim
before the administrative agency may prefer not to risk being estopped by a
low-stakes administrative decision in the high-stakes civil lawsuit.8 7 This would
have the effect of undermining legislative and public policy in favor of encour-
aging access to benefits and remedies available through a particular adminis-
trative agency.
Second, if the main purpose of the administrative hearing is to provide an
expedited determination of the issue before it, the purpose will not be served if
parties to the proceeding try to turn it into a full-blown formal adjudication so
as to avoid being precluded on any issues that may form the basis of future
litigation. The Restatement states the issue as follows:
The scheme of [legislative] remedies may intend that the proceedings in
an administrative tribunal be determinative only for the purposes of the con-
troversy immediately before the agency. For example, the scheme may con-
template that the agency proceedings be as expeditious as possible. One as-
pect of assuring expeditiousness is to confine the stakes to the matter
immediately in controversy. Thus, issue preclusion may be withheld so that
the parties will not be induced to dispute the administrative proceeding in
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comment j (1982). It is not
clear that the plaintiff in Bresnahan can be said to have been unfairly surprised by
being estopped on the issue of whether she stole from her employer. Although the
amounts at stake in the two proceedings were substantially dissimilar, if Ms. Bresna-
han was truly serious about obtaining unemployment benefits, she would have every
incentive to fully contest the issue of whether of not she stole from her employer since
it was foreseeable that it would be the decisive issue in the proceeding. Bresnahan, 726
S.W.2d at 327.
87. Agatstein, supra note 9, at 32.
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anticipation of its effect in another proceeding. 8
Once it becomes generally known that administrative adjudications may
carry preclusive effects, parties will more vigorously contest the issues in an
administrative context which may form the basis for the final decision. 9 They
may hire attorneys to represent them where they previously would not have
done so. The parties, through their attorneys, will very likely argue for pro-
ceedings which are as formal as possible. They will increase their use of pre-
hearing discovery, and increase attempts to exclude evidence which is ordina-
rily admissible in administrative adjudications. At the same time, the parties
will try to introduce as much testimonial and documentary evidence as
possible.
But whether the parties are successful in making hearings more "judicial"
is beside the point. Even though the administrative hearing officer has a great
deal of discretion in deciding how to conduct a hearing, dealing with this type
of maneuvering will have the net effect of encumbering what is meant to be an
expedited process.
One of the major benefits of administrative adjudication is the expeditious
and efficient manner in which hearings are conducted. This benefit may be lost
if the judiciary applies collateral estoppel to administrative determinations
without taking into account the implications for the decision-making processes
of a given agency. The net effect may be that the caseload of the judiciary
may be shifted to administrative agencies, an effect which is not a goal of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.9"
III. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of collateral estoppel may properly be applied to decisions
made by an administrative agency acting in an adjudicative capacity. When
the defense of collateral estoppel is raised in a proceeding subsequent to an
administrative adjudication, the second tribunal should take care to ascertain
that the administrative proceeding was conducted in accordance with the "es-
sential elements of adjudication." This analysis should take into account
whether the parties to the administrative proceeding had the incentive to fully
litigate the issue upon which collateral estoppel is based.
If the administrative proceeding was sufficiently trial-like, the inquiry
should shift to an analysis of potential effects upon the administrative agency.
There may be compelling policy reasons why the decisions of a particular ad-
ministrative agency should not be given preclusive effect. If an undue burden
will be placed upon the ability of the administrative agency to fulfill its
legislative mandate, its decisions should not be given preclusive effect regard-
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment h (1982).
89. Agatstein, supra note 9, at 32-33; Carlisle, supra note 12 at 93.
90. Carlisle, supra note 12, at 93-94.
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